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Summary 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) entered into force on January 1, 1994. The 
agreement was signed by President George H.W. Bush on December 17, 1992, and approved by 
Congress on November 20, 1993. The NAFTA Implementation Act was signed into law by 
President William J. Clinton on December 8, 1993 (P.L. 103-182). The overall economic impact 
of NAFTA is difficult to measure since trade and investment trends are influenced by numerous 
other economic variables, such as economic growth, inflation, and currency fluctuations. The 
agreement may have accelerated the trade liberalization that was already taking place, but many 
of these changes may have taken place with or without an agreement. Nevertheless, NAFTA is 
significant because it was the most comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) negotiated at the 
time and contained several groundbreaking provisions. A legacy of the agreement is that it has 
served as a template or model for the new generation of FTAs that the United States later 
negotiated and it also served as a template for certain provisions in multilateral trade negotiations 
as part of the Uruguay Round. 
The 113th Congress faces numerous issues related to international trade. Canada and Mexico are 
the first and third largest U.S. trading partners, respectively. With the two countries participating 
in the negotiations to conclude a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement among the 
United States and 11 other countries, policy issues related to NAFTA continue to be of interest for 
Congress. If an agreement is concluded, it could affect the rules and market access commitments 
governing North American trade and investment since NAFTA entered into force. A related trade 
policy issue in which the effects of NAFTA may be explored is the possible renewal of Trade 
Promotion Authority (TPA; formerly known as “fast-track authority”) to provide expedited 
procedures for the consideration of bills to implement trade agreements.  
NAFTA was controversial when first proposed, mostly because it was the first FTA involving two 
wealthy, developed countries and a developing country. The political debate surrounding the 
agreement was divisive with proponents arguing that the agreement would help generate 
thousands of jobs and reduce income disparity in the region, while opponents warned that the 
agreement would cause huge job losses in the United States as companies moved production to 
Mexico to lower costs. In reality, NAFTA did not cause the huge job losses feared by the critics or 
the large economic gains predicted by supporters. The net overall effect of NAFTA on the U.S. 
economy appears to have been relatively modest, primarily because trade with Canada and 
Mexico account for a small percentage of U.S. GDP. However, there were worker and firm 
adjustment costs as the three countries adjusted to more open trade and investment among their 
economies.  
The rising number of bilateral and regional trade agreements throughout the world and the rising 
presence of China in Latin America could have implications for U.S. trade policy with its NAFTA 
partners. Some proponents of open and rules-based trade maintain that a further deepening of 
economic relations with Canada and Mexico will help promote a common trade agenda with 
shared values and generate economic growth. Some opponents argue that the agreement has 
caused worker displacement and that NAFTA needs to be reopened. One possible way of doing 
this is through the proposed TPP. The ongoing TPP negotiations, launched in the fall of 2008, 
may not result in a reopening of NAFTA, but could alter some of the rules and market access 
commitments governing North American trade and investment. 
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Introduction 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has been in effect since January 1, 1994. 
Signed by President George H.W. Bush on December 17, 1992, and approved by Congress on 
November 20, 1993, the NAFTA Implementation Act was signed into law by President William J. 
Clinton on December 8, 1993 (P.L. 103-182). NAFTA continues to be of interest to Congress 
because of the importance of Canada and Mexico as U.S. trading partners, and also because of the 
implications NAFTA has for U.S. trade policy. This report provides an overview of North 
American trade liberalization before NAFTA, an overview of NAFTA provisions, the economic 
effects of NAFTA, and policy considerations.  
The 113th Congress, in both its legislative and oversight capacities, faces numerous issues related 
to international trade. The Obama Administration has made the proposed Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement one of its top trade priorities.1 The United States, Canada, 
and Mexico, along with nine other countries, are participating in the TPP negotiations. If 
negotiations continue to move forward, it may affect the rules and market access commitments 
governing North American trade since NAFTA entered into force. A related trade policy issue in 
which the effects of NAFTA may be explored is the possible renewal of Trade Promotion 
Authority (TPA; formerly known as “fast-track authority”) to provide expedited procedures for 
the consideration of bills to implement trade agreements.2 
Many trade policy experts give credit to free trade agreements (FTAs) for enhancing economic 
linkages between countries, creating more efficient production processes, increasing the 
availability of lower-priced consumer goods, and improving living standards and working 
conditions.3 Others have blamed FTAs for disappointing employment trends and for not having 
done enough to improve competitiveness, labor standards, and environmental conditions abroad.4 
A legacy of NAFTA is that it has served as a model for other FTAs that the United States later 
negotiated and also for multilateral negotiations. NAFTA initiated a new generation of trade 
agreements in the Western Hemisphere and other parts of the world, influencing negotiations in 
areas such as market access, rules of origin, intellectual property rights, foreign investment, 
dispute resolution, worker rights, and environmental protection. The United States currently has 
FTAs with 20 countries. As with NAFTA, these trade agreements have often been supported or 
criticized on similar arguments related to jobs.  
                                                 
1 See CRS Report R42694, The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Negotiations and Issues for Congress, coordinated by 
Ian F. Fergusson. 
2 Trade Promotion Authority, formerly called “fast-track authority” is the authority Congress grants to the President to 
enter into certain reciprocal trade agreements, and to have their implementing bills considered under expedited 
legislative procedures, provided the President observes certain statutory obligations. For more information, see CRS 
Report RL33743, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) and the Role of Congress in Trade Policy, by William H. Cooper. 
3 Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges, Institute for 
International Economics, October 2005, Chapter 1. 
4 Pardee Center Task Force Report, The Future of North American Trade Policy: Lessons from NAFTA, Boston 
University, November 2009. 
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Market Opening Prior to NAFTA 
The concept of economic integration in North America was not a new one at the time NAFTA 
negotiations started. In 1911, President William Howard Taft signed a reciprocal trade agreement 
with Canadian Prime Minister Sir Wilfred Laurier. After a bitter election, Canadians rejected free 
trade and ousted Prime Minister Laurier, thereby ending the agreement. In 1965, the United States 
and Canada signed the U.S.-Canada Automotive Products Agreement that liberalized trade in 
cars, trucks, tires, and automotive parts between the two countries.5 The Auto Pact was credited as 
a pioneer in creating an integrated North American automotive sector. In the case of Mexico, the 
government had been implementing reform measures since the mid-1980s, prior to NAFTA, to 
liberalize its economy. By 1990, when NAFTA negotiations began, Mexico had already taken 
significant steps towards liberalizing its protectionist trade regime.  
The U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1989 
The United States and Canada recently marked the 25th anniversary of the October 3, 1987 
signing of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The FTA was the first economically 
significant bilateral FTA signed by the United States.6 Implementing legislation7 was approved by 
both Houses of Congress under “fast-track authority”—now known as trade promotion authority 
(TPA)—and signed by President Ronald Reagan on September 28, 1988. While the FTA 
generated significant policy debate in the United States, it was a watershed moment for Canada. 
Controversy surrounding the proposed FTA led to the so-called “free trade election” in 1988, in 
which sitting Progressive Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, who negotiated the 
agreement, defeated Liberal party leader John Turner, who vowed to reject it if elected. After the 
election, the FTA was passed by Parliament in December 1988, and it came into effect between 
the two nations on January 1, 1989. At the time, it probably was the most comprehensive bilateral 
FTA negotiated worldwide and contained several groundbreaking provisions. It: 
• Eliminated all tariffs by 1998. Many were eliminated immediately, and the 
remaining tariffs were phased-out in 5-10 years. 
• Continued the 1965 U.S.-Canada Auto Pact, but tightened its rules of origin. 
Some Canadian auto sector practices not covered by the Auto Pact were ended by 
1998. 
• Provided national treatment for covered services providers and liberalized 
financial services trade. Facilitated cross-border travel for business professionals. 
• Committed to provide prospective national treatment for investments originating 
in the other, although established derogations from national treatment such as for 
national security or prudential reasons were allowed to continue. Banned 
imposition of performance requirements, such as local content, import 
substitution, or local sourcing requirements. 
                                                 
5 The Canada-United States Automotive Products Agreement removed tariffs on cars, trucks, buses, tires, and 
automotive parts between the two countries. NAFTA effectively superseded this agreement. 
6 Prior to the U.S.-Canada FTA, the only bilateral U.S. FTA was with Israel. 
7 United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-449).  
NAFTA at 20: Overview and Trade Effects 
 
Congressional Research Service 3 
• Expanded the size of federal government procurement markets available for 
competitive bidding from suppliers of the other country. It did not include sub-
federal government procurement. 
• Provided for a binding binational panel to resolve disputes arising from the 
agreement (a Canadian insistence). 
• Prohibited most import and export restrictions on energy products, including 
minimum export prices. This was carried forth in NAFTA only with regard to 
Canada-U.S. energy trade. 
Many of these provisions were incorporated into, or expanded in, NAFTA. However, the FTA did 
not include, or specifically exempted, some issues that would appear in NAFTA for the first time. 
These include 
• Intellectual property rights (IPR). The FTA did not contain language on 
intellectual property rights. NAFTA was the first FTA to include meaningful 
disciplines on IPR. 
• Cultural exemption. It exempted the broadcasting, film, and publishing sectors. 
This exemption continues in NAFTA. 
• Transportation services and investment in the Canadian energy sector were 
excluded from the FTA. These exclusions were limited in NAFTA. 
• Trade remedies. Neither the FTA nor NAFTA ended the use of trade remedy 
actions (anti-dumping, countervailing duty, or safeguards) against the other. This 
was a key Canadian goal of the FTA. NAFTA did create a separate dispute 
settlement mechanism to adjudicate trade remedy disputes, but this mechanism 
has not been replicated in other FTAs. 
• Softwood lumber. The FTA grandfathered in the then-present 1986 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) governing softwood lumber trade. Over 
time, the MOU has been replaced by other agreements—such as the current 
Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA)—and, at times, by resort to trade remedy 
actions. 
• Agricultural supply management. Canada was able to exempt its agriculture 
supply management system, although it committed to allow a small increase in 
imports of dairy, poultry, and eggs, which carried over into the NAFTA. The 
United States was also able to exclude certain products from liberalization 
commitments under the FTA and the NAFTA. 
Mexico’s Pre-NAFTA Trade Liberalization Efforts 
Well before NAFTA negotiations began, Mexico was already liberalizing its protectionist trade 
and investment policies that had been in place for decades (see Appendix B for more information 
on Mexico’s pre-NAFTA protectionist policies). The restrictive trade regime began after Mexico’s 
revolutionary period and remained until the early- to mid-1980’s when the country was facing a 
debt crisis. It was at this time that the government took unilateral steps to open and modernize its 
economy by relaxing investment policies and liberalizing trade barriers. The trade liberalization 
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measures that began in the mid-1980s shifted Mexico from one of the world’s most protected 
economies into one of the most open. Mexico now has 12 FTAs involving 44 countries.8 
Mexico’s first steps in opening its closed economy focused on reforming its import substitution 
policies in the mid-1980s. Further reforms were made in 1986 when Mexico became a member of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). As a condition of becoming a GATT 
member, for example, Mexico agreed to lower its maximum tariff rates to 50%. Mexico went 
further by reducing its highest tariff rate from 100% to 20%. Mexico’s trade-weighted average 
tariff fell from 25% in 1985 to about 19% in 1989.9 
Although Mexico had been lowering trade and investment restrictions since 1986, the number of 
remaining barriers for U.S. exports remained high at the time of the NAFTA negotiations. Mexico 
required import licenses on 230 products from the United States, affecting about 7% of the value 
of U.S. exports to Mexico. Prior to its entry into GATT, Mexico required import licenses on all 
imports. At the time of the NAFTA negotiations, about 60% of U.S. agricultural exports to 
Mexico required import licenses. Mexico also had numerous other nontariff barriers, such as 
“official import prices,” an arbitrary customs valuation system that raised duty assessments.10 
For Mexico, an FTA with the United States represented a way to lock in the reforms of its market 
opening measures from the mid-1980s to transform Mexico’s formerly statist economy after the 
devastating debt crisis of the 1980s.11 The combination of the severe economic impact of the debt 
crisis, low domestic savings, and an increasingly overvalued peso, put pressure on the Mexican 
government to adopt market-opening economic reforms and boost imports of goods and capital to 
encourage more competition in the Mexican market. An FTA with the United States was a way of 
blocking domestic efforts to roll back Mexican reforms, especially in the politically sensitive 
agriculture sector. NAFTA helped deflect protectionist demands of industrial groups and special 
interest groups in Mexico.12 One of the main goals of the Mexican government was to increase 
investment confidence in order to attract greater flows of foreign investment and spur economic 
growth. Since the entry into force of NAFTA, Mexico has used the agreement as a basic model 
for other FTAs Mexico has signed with other countries.13 
For the United States, NAFTA represented an opportunity to expand the growing export market to 
the south, but it also represented a political opportunity for the United States and Mexico to work 
together in resolving some of the tensions in the bilateral relationship.14 An FTA with Mexico 
would help U.S. businesses expand exports to a growing market of almost 100 million people. 
U.S. officials also recognized that imports from Mexico would likely include higher U.S. content 
than imports from Asian countries. In addition to the trade and investment opportunities that 
                                                 
8 See CRS Report R40784, Mexico’s Free Trade Agreements, by M. Angeles Villarreal.  
9 United States International Trade Commission (USITC), The Likely Impact on the United States of a Free Trade 
Agreement with Mexico, Publication 2353, February 1991. 
10 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
11 Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges, Institute for 
International Economics, October 2005.  
12 Ibid. 
13 Mexico has a total of 12 free trade agreements involving 44 countries. These include agreements with most countries 
in the Western Hemisphere including the United States, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Peru, 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. In addition, Mexico has negotiated FTAs outside of the Western Hemisphere 
and entered into agreements with Israel, Japan, and the European Union. 
14 Hufbauer and Schott, NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges, pp. 2-3. 
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NAFTA represented, an agreement with Mexico would be a way to support the growth of political 
pluralism and a deepening of democratic processes in Mexico. NAFTA also presented an 
opportunity for the United States to spur the slow progress on the Uruguay Round of multilateral 
trade negotiations.15  
Overview of NAFTA Provisions 
At the time that NAFTA was implemented, the U.S.-Canada FTA was already in effect and U.S. 
tariffs on most Mexican goods were low. NAFTA opened up the U.S. market to increased 
Mexican imports and the Mexican market to the United States and Canada, creating a single 
market with 400 million people and accounting for one-third of the world’s output of 
approximately $1 trillion per year.16 Some of the key NAFTA provisions included tariff and non-
tariff trade liberalization, rules of origin, services trade, foreign investment, intellectual property 
rights protection, government procurement, and dispute resolution. Labor and environmental 
provisions were included in separate NAFTA side agreements.  
Removal of Trade Barriers 
The market opening provisions of the agreement gradually eliminated all tariffs and most non-
tariff barriers on goods produced and traded within North America over a period of fifteen years 
after it entered into force. Some tariffs were eliminated immediately, while others were phased 
out in various schedules of five to fifteen years. U.S. import-sensitive sectors, such as glassware, 
footwear, and ceramic tile, received longer phase-out schedules.17 NAFTA provided the option of 
accelerating tariff reductions if the countries involved agreed.18 The agreement included 
safeguard provisions in which the importing country could increase tariffs, or impose quotas in 
some cases, on imports during a transition period if domestic producers faced serious injury as a 
result of increased imports from another NAFTA country. It terminated all existing drawback 
programs by January 1, 2001.19 
Given that the U.S.-Canada FTA was already in place, most of the market opening measures 
resulted in the removal of U.S. tariffs and quotas applied to imports from Mexico, and Mexican 
trade barriers applied to imports from the United States and Canada. At the time that NAFTA 
went into effect, about 40% of U.S. imports from Mexico entered duty-free and the remainder 
faced duties of up to 35%, with a trade-weighted average rate of about 7%. Mexico’s trade-
weighted tariff on U.S. agricultural products averaged about 11%. Also affecting U.S.-Mexico 
trade were both countries’ phytosanitary rules, Mexican import licensing requirements, and U.S. 
marketing orders.20  
                                                 
15 Ibid. 
16 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, NAFTA at 10: Progress, Potential, and Precedents, p. 20. 
17 Governments of Canada, the United Mexican States, and the United States of America, Description of the Proposed 
North American Free Trade Agreement, August 12, 1992. 
18 Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1993, pp. 171-175, 180-181. 
19 A duty drawback is the refund or waiver in whole or in part of customs duties assessed or collected upon importation 
of an article or materials which are subsequently exported. 
20 Marketing orders were designed to set national guidelines for product quality, market promotion, and supply levels. 
The most significant Mexican products that were affected by U.S. marketing orders included tomatoes, onions, 
(continued...) 
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Some of the more significant changes took place in the textiles, apparel, automotive, and 
agricultural industries. Elimination of trade barriers in these key industries are summarized below. 
• Textiles and Apparel Industries. NAFTA phased out all duties on textile and 
apparel goods within North America meeting specific NAFTA rules of origin21 
over a 10-year period. Prior to NAFTA, 65% of U.S. apparel imports from 
Mexico entered duty-free and quota-free, and the remaining 35% faced an 
average tariff rate of 17.9%. Mexico’s average tariff on U.S. textile and apparel 
products was 16%, with duties as high as 20% on some products.22 
• Automotive Industry. NAFTA phased out Mexico’s restrictive auto decree. It 
phased out all U.S. tariffs imports from Mexico and Mexican tariffs on U.S. and 
Canadian products as long as they met the rules of origin requirements of 62.5% 
North American content for autos, light trucks, engines and transmissions; and 
60% for other vehicles and automotive parts. Some tariffs were eliminated 
immediately, while others were phased out in periods of 5 to 10 years. Prior to 
NAFTA, the United States assessed the following tariffs on imports from 
Mexico: 2.5% on automobiles, 25% on light-duty trucks, and a trade-weighted 
average of 3.1% for automotive parts. Mexican tariffs on U.S. and Canadian 
automotive products were as follows: 20% on automobiles and light trucks, and 
10-20% on auto parts.23 
• Agriculture. NAFTA set out separate bilateral undertakings on cross-border 
trade in agriculture, one between Canada and Mexico, and the other between 
Mexico and the United States. As a general matter, U.S.-Canada FTA provisions 
continued to apply on trade with Canada.24 Regarding U.S.-Mexico agriculture 
trade, NAFTA eliminated most non-tariff barriers in agricultural trade, either 
through their conversion to tariff-rate quotas (TRQ’s)25 or ordinary tariffs. Tariffs 
were phased out over a period of 15 years with sensitive products such as sugar 
and corn receiving the longest phase-out periods. Approximately one-half of 
U.S.-Mexico agricultural trade became duty-free when the agreement went into 
effect. Prior to NAFTA, most tariffs, on average, in agricultural trade between the 
United States and Mexico were fairly low though some U.S. exports to Mexico 
faced tariffs as high as 12%. However, approximately one-fourth of U.S. 
agricultural exports to Mexico (by value) were subjected to restrictive import 
licensing requirements.26  
                                                                 
(...continued) 
avocados, grapefruit, oranges, olives, and table grapes. 
21 NAFTA rules of origin for textiles and apparel define when imported textile or apparel goods qualify for preferential 
treatments. For most products, the rule of origin is “yarn forward”, which means that goods must be produced from 
yarn made in a NAFTA country to benefit from preferential treatment.  
22 Business Roundtable, NAFTA: A Decade of Growth, Prepared by The Trade Partnership, Washington, DC, February 
2004, p. 33. 
23 Ibid., p. 30. 
24 Governments of Canada, the United Mexican States, and the United States of America, Description of the Proposed 
North American Free Trade Agreement, August 12, 1992, p. 12. 
25 Tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) allowed NAFTA partners to export specified quantities of a product to other NAFTA 
countries at a relatively low tariff, but subjected all imports of the product above a pre-determined threshold to a higher 
tariff. 
26 Business Roundtable, NAFTA: A Decade of Growth, p. 35. 
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Services Trade Liberalization 
NAFTA services provisions established a set of basic rules and obligations in services trade 
among partner countries. The agreement expanded on initiatives in the U.S.-Canada FTA and the 
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations to create internationally-agreed disciplines on 
government regulation of trade in services.27 The agreement granted services providers certain 
rights concerning nondiscriminatory treatment, cross-border sales and entry, investment, and 
access to information. However, there were certain exclusions and reservations by each country. 
These included maritime shipping (United States), film and publishing (Canada), and oil and gas 
drilling (Mexico).28 Although NAFTA liberalized certain service sectors in Mexico, particularly 
financial services, which profoundly altered its banking sector, other sectors were barely 
affected.29 In telecommunications services, NAFTA partners agreed to exclude provision of, but 
not the use of, basic telecommunications services. NAFTA granted a “bill of rights” for the 
providers and users of telecommunications services, including access to public 
telecommunications services; connection to private lines that reflect economic costs and available 
on a flat-rate pricing basis; and the right to choose, purchase, or lease terminal equipment best 
suited to their needs.30 However, NAFTA did not require parties to authorize a person of another 
NAFTA country to provide or operate telecommunications transport networks or services. 
NAFTA did not bar a party from maintaining a monopoly provider of public networks or services, 
such as Telmex, Mexico’s dominant telecommunications company.31 
Other Provisions 
In addition to market opening measures through the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers, 
NAFTA incorporated numerous other provisions, including foreign investment, intellectual 
property rights (IPR), dispute resolution, and government procurement.  
• Foreign Investment. NAFTA removed significant investment barriers, ensured 
basic protections for NAFTA investors, and provided a mechanism for the 
settlement of disputes between investors and a NAFTA country. NAFTA 
provided for “non-discriminatory treatment” for foreign investment by NAFTA 
parties in certain sectors of other NAFTA countries.32 The agreement included 
explicit country-specific liberalization commitments and exceptions to national 
treatment. Exemptions from NAFTA investment provisions include the energy 
sector in Mexico in which the Mexican government reserved the right to prohibit 
foreign investment. It also included exceptions related to national security and to 
Canada’s cultural industries.33 
                                                 
27 The Governments of Canada, the United Mexican States, and the United States of America, Description of the 
Proposed North American Free Trade Agreement, August 12, 1992, pp. 23-24. 
28 United States General Accounting Office (GAO), “North American Free Trade Agreement: Assessment of Major 
Issues, Volume 2,” Report to the Congress, September 1993, pp. 35-36.  
29 Hufbauer and Schott, NAFTA Revisited, pp. 25-29. 
30 GAO, Report to Congress, September 1993, pp. 38-39. 
31 Description of the Proposed North American Free Trade Agreement, August 12, 1992, p. 29. 
32 Description of the Proposed North American Free Trade Agreement, August 12, 1992, pp. 30-31. 
33 Ibid., pp. 31-32.  
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• IPR. NAFTA built upon the then-ongoing Uruguay Round negotiations that 
would create the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
agreement in the World Trade Organization and on various existing international 
intellectual property treaties. The agreement set out specific enforceable 
commitments by NAFTA parties regarding the protection of copyrights, patents, 
trademarks, and trade secrets, among other provisions.  
• Dispute Settlement Procedures. NAFTA’s provisions for preventing and settling 
disputes were built upon provisions in the U.S.-Canada FTA. NAFTA created a 
system of arbitration for resolving disputes that included initial consultations, 
taking the issue to the NAFTA Trade Commission, or going through arbitral 
panel proceedings.34 NAFTA included separate dispute settlement provisions for 
addressing disputes over antidumping and countervailing duty determinations.  
• Government Procurement. NAFTA opened up a significant portion of federal 
government procurement in each country on a nondiscriminatory basis to 
suppliers from other NAFTA countries for goods and services. It contains some 
limitations for procurement by state-owned enterprises.35  
NAFTA Side Agreements on Labor and the Environment 
The NAFTA text did not include labor or environmental provisions, which was a major concern 
to many in Congress at the time of the agreement’s consideration. Some policy makers called for 
additional provisions to address numerous concerns about labor and environmental issues, 
specifically in Mexico. Other policy makers argued that the economic growth generated by the 
FTA would increase Mexico’s resources available for environmental and worker rights protection. 
However, congressional concerns from policy makers, as well as concerns from labor and 
environmental groups, remained strong. 
Shortly after he began his presidency, President Clinton addressed labor and environmental 
concerns by joining his counterparts in Canada and Mexico in negotiating formal side 
agreements. The NAFTA implementing legislation included provisions related to the side 
agreements, authorizing U.S. participation in NAFTA labor and environmental commissions and 
appropriations for these activities. The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
(NAALC) and the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) entered 
into force on January 1, 1994, the same day as NAFTA.36 NAFTA implementing legislation also 
included two adjustment assistance programs, designed to ease trade-related labor problems: the 
NAFTA Transitional Adjustment Assistance (NAFTA-TAA) Program and the U.S. Community 
Adjustment and Investment Program (USCAIP).  
The labor and environmental side agreements included language to promote cooperation on labor 
and environmental matters as well as provisions to address a party’s failure to enforce its own 
labor and environmental laws. Perhaps most notable were the side agreements’ dispute settlement 
                                                 
34 If the parties are unable to resolve the issue through consultations, they may take the dispute to the NAFTA Trade 
Commission, which is comprised of Ministers or cabinet-level officers designated by each country. A party may also 
request the establishment of an arbitral panel, which may make recommendations for the resolution of the dispute. 
35 GAO, Report to Congress, September 1993, pp. 69-71. 
36 The USCAIP, administered by the North American Development Bank, provides financial assistance to communities 
with significant job losses due to changes in trade patterns with Mexico or Canada as a result of NAFTA. 
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processes that, as a last resort, may impose monetary assessments and sanctions to address a 
party’s failure to enforce its laws.37 NAFTA marked the first time that labor and environmental 
provisions were associated with an FTA. For many, it represented an opportunity for cooperating 
on environmental and labor matters across borders and for establishing a new type of relationship 
among NAFTA partners.38  
In addition to the two trilateral side agreements, the United States and Mexico entered into a 
bilateral side agreement to NAFTA on border environmental cooperation.39 In this agreement, the 
two governments committed to cooperate on developing environmental infrastructure projects 
along the U.S.-Mexico border to address concerns about the degradation of the environment 
along the U.S.-Mexico border due to increased economic activity. The agreement established two 
organizations to address these concerns: the Border Environment Cooperation Commission 
(BECC), located in Juárez, Mexico, and the North American Development Bank (NADBank), 
located in San Antonio, Texas. The sister organizations work closely together and with other 
partners at the federal, state and local level in the United States and Mexico to develop, certify, 
and facilitate financing for water and wastewater treatment, municipal solid waste disposal, and 
related projects on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border region. Both organizations also have 
ongoing efforts to measure the results of the projects on the border region. From 1995 to 2011, 
BECC certified 189 projects (86 in the United States and 103 in Mexico), representing nearly 
$4.3 billion in environmental infrastructure investment, directly benefiting 14 million border 
residents. NADBank has financed 152 of these projects with approximately $1.33 billion in loans 
and grants.40 These projects have provided border residents with more access to drinking water, 
sewer and wastewater treatment. They also include water conservation, air quality, and renewable 
energy projects.41  
Trade Trends and Economic Effects 
Many economists contend that trade liberalization promotes overall economic growth and 
efficiency among trading partners, although there are short-term adjustment costs. NAFTA was 
unusual in global terms because it was the first time that an FTA linked two wealthy, developed 
countries with a low-income developing country. For this reason, the agreement received 
considerable attention by U.S. policy makers, manufacturers, service providers, agriculture 
producers, labor unions, non-government organizations, and academics. Proponents argued that 
the agreement would help generate thousands of jobs and reduce income disparity between 
Mexico and its northern neighbors. Opponents warned that the agreement would create huge job 
losses in the United States as companies moved production to Mexico to lower costs.42  
                                                 
37 For more information, see CRS Report RS22823, Overview of Labor Enforcement Issues in Free Trade Agreements, 
by Mary Jane Bolle, and CRS Report 97-291, NAFTA: Related Environmental Issues and Initiatives, by Mary 
Tiemann. 
38 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, NAFTA at 10: Progress, Potential, and Precedents, pp. 20-30.  
39 The Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican 
States Concerning the Establishment of a Border Environment Cooperation Commission and a North American 
Development Bank, November 1993.  
40 Border Environment Cooperation Commission, 2011 Annual Report, p. 7. 
41 Ibid. 
42 See Ross Perot with Pat Choate, Save Your Job, Save Our Country: Why NAFTA Must be Stopped-Now!, New York, 
1993. 
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Estimating the economic impact of trade agreements is a daunting task due to a lack of data and 
important theoretical and practical matters associated with generating results from economic 
models. In addition, such estimates provide an incomplete accounting of the total economic 
effects of trade agreements.43 Numerous studies suggest that NAFTA achieved many of the 
intended trade and economic benefits.44 Other studies suggest that NAFTA has come at a cost to 
U.S. workers.45 This has been in keeping with what most economists maintain, that trade 
liberalization promotes overall economic growth among trading partners, but that there are both 
winners and losers from adjustments.  
Not all changes in trade and investment patterns within North America since 1994 can be 
attributed to NAFTA because trade has also been affected by a number of factors. The sharp 
devaluation of the peso at the end of the 1990s and the associated recession in Mexico had 
considerable effects on trade, as did the rapid growth of the U.S. economy during most of the 
1990s and, more recently, the economic slowdown caused by the 2008 financial crisis. Trade-
related job gains and losses since NAFTA may have accelerated trends that were ongoing prior to 
NAFTA and may not be totally attributable to the trade agreement. 
U.S. Trade Trends with NAFTA Partners 
Overall Trade 
U.S. trade with its NAFTA partners has more than tripled since the agreement took effect. It has 
increased more rapidly than trade with the rest of the world. In 2011, trilateral trade among 
NAFTA partners reached the $1 trillion threshold. Trade between the United States and Mexico 
contributed considerably to growth in North American trade, accounting for approximately half of 
the increase in regional trade since 1994. Between 1993 and 2013, total U.S. trade with Mexico 
increased by 522%. In comparison, U.S. trade with Canada increased by 200%, while trade with 
non-NAFTA countries increased by 279%. In 2013, Canada was the leading market for U.S. 
exports, while Mexico ranked second. The two countries accounted for 33% of total U.S. exports 
in 2013. In imports, Canada and Mexico ranked second and third, respectively, as suppliers of 
U.S. imports in 2013. The two countries accounted for 27% of U.S. imports.46 
Most of the trade-related effects of NAFTA may be attributed to changes in trade and investment 
patterns with Mexico because economic integration between Canada and the United States had 
already been taking place. As mentioned previously, while NAFTA may have accelerated U.S.-
Mexico trade since 1993, other factors, such as economic growth patterns, also affected trade. As 
trade tends to increase during cycles of economic growth, it tends to decrease as growth declines. 
                                                 
43 For more information, see CRS Report R41660, U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement and Potential Employment 
Effects: Analysis of Studies, by Mary Jane Bolle and James K. Jackson. 
44 See for example, Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, NAFTA Revisited: Achievements and Challenges, 
Institute for International Economics, October 2005; Center for Strategic and International Studies, NAFTA’s Impact on 
North America: The First Decade, Edited by Sidney Weintraub, 2004; and U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Opening 
Markets, Creating Jobs: Estimated U.S. Employment Effects of Trade with FTA Partners, 2010. 
45 See for example, Robert E. Scott, Heading South: U.S.-Mexico Trade and Job Displacement under NAFTA, 
Economic Policy Institute, May 3, 2011; and The Frederick S. Pardee Center, The Future of North American Trade 
Policy: Lessons from NAFTA, Boston University, November 2009.  
46 Trade statistics in this paragraph are derived from data from the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Interactive 
Tariff and Trade Data Web, at http://dataweb.usitc.gov. 
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The economic downturns in 2001 and 2009, for example, likely played a role in the decline in 
both U.S. exports to and imports from Canada and Mexico, as shown in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. U.S. Merchandise Trade with NAFTA Partners: 1993-2013 
(billions of nominal U.S. dollars) 
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Source: Compiled by CRS using trade data from the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Interactive Tariff 
and Trade Data Web, at http://dataweb.usitc.gov. 
Energy Trade Implications 
Trade in petroleum products is a central component of U.S. trade with both Canada and Mexico. 
Approximately 16% of total trade with NAFTA partners is in petroleum products. Canada and 
Mexico accounted for 40% ($108.2 billion) of total U.S. crude oil imports ($273.5 billion) in 
2013. Canada is the leading supplier of crude petroleum oil to the United States, followed by 
Saudi Arabia and Mexico. If petroleum products are excluded from trade statistics, the United 
States has had a trade surplus with NAFTA partners in merchandise trade since 2011, as shown in 
Figure 2. In 2013, the trade surplus in non-petroleum products was an estimated $9.2 billion. 
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Figure 2. Non-Petroleum Trade with NAFTA Partners: 1993-2013 
(billions of nominal U.S. dollars) 
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Source: Compiled by CRS using trade data from the U.S. International Trade Commission’s (USITC’s) 
Interactive Tariff and Trade Data Web, at http://dataweb.usitc.gov. 
Notes: The United States uses different classifications of trade for trade statistics. Trade data in this chart 
excludes trade in three categories, which include Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) code 2709, petroleum oils 
and oils from bituminous minerals, crude; HTS code 2710, petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals 
(other than crude) and products therefrom, NESOI, containing 70% (by weight) or more of these oils; and HTS 
code 2711, petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons. See http://dataweb.usitc.gov. 
Imports in crude petroleum oil rank first among the five leading import items from NAFTA 
partners, as shown in Figure 3.47 The value of crude oil imports from both Canada and Mexico in 
2013 totaled $108.3 billion. Since 2007, crude petroleum imports have ranked first among leading 
imports from both countries, reaching a high of $109.8 billion in 2012. In 2009, the value of 
crude oil imports dropped considerably, from $100.1 billion in 2008 to $59.1 billion in 2009, 
reflecting a drop in oil prices that year.  
                                                 
47 This statistic is based on the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTS). The HTS comprises a 
hierarchical structure for describing all goods in trade for duty, quota, and statistical purposes. This structure is based 
upon the international Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS), administered by the World 
Customs Organization in Brussels. 
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Figure 3. Top Five Import Items from NAFTA Partners 
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Source: Compiled by CRS using trade data from the USITC at http://dataweb.usitc.gov. 
Notes: Statistics in this figure are derived from the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) of the United States at 
the 4-digit level. The HTS comprises a hierarchical structure for describing all goods in trade for duty, quota, and 
statistical purposes. This structure is based upon the international Harmonized Commodity Description and 
Coding System (HS), administered by the World Customs Organization in Brussels. See http://dataweb.usitc.gov. 
Trade with Canada 
U.S. trade with Canada more than doubled in the first decade of the FTA/NAFTA (1989-1999) 
from $166.5 billion to $362.2 billion. U.S. exports to Canada increased from $100.2 billion in 
1993 to $300.2 billion in 2013, an increase of 200%. U.S. imports from Canada increased from 
$110.9 billion in 1993 to $332.1 billion in 2013, also a 200% increase (see Table A-1). After 
falling off during the recession of 2001, total trade with Canada reached a new high of $596.5 
billion in 2008, only to fall victim to the financial crisis in 2009 when it fell to $429.6 billion. In 
2011, total trade had returned to 2008 levels at $597.3 billion. The United States has run a trade 
deficit with Canada since the FTA/NAFTA era, increasing from $9.9 billion in 1989 to $74.6 
billion in 2008, before falling back during the 2009 recession. In 2013, the trade deficit with 
Canada was $31.9 billion. While the increase in the trade deficit with Canada has been attributed 
to the FTA/NAFTA, the increase has been uneven and may also be attributed to other economic 
factors, such as energy prices.48 
                                                 
48 Trade statistics in this paragraph are derived from data from the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Interactive 
Tariff and Trade Data Web, at http://dataweb.usitc.gov. 
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Trade with Mexico 
The United States is, by far, Mexico’s leading partner in merchandise trade. U.S. exports to 
Mexico increased rapidly since NAFTA, increasing from $41.6 billion in 1993 to $226.2 billion 
in 2013, an increase of 444% (see Table A-1 in Appendix A). U.S. imports from Mexico 
increased from $39.9 billion in 1993 to $280.5 billion in 2013, an increase of 603%. The trade 
balance with Mexico went from a surplus of $1.7 billion in 1993 to a deficit of $61.4 billion in 
2012. In 2013, the trade deficit with Mexico decreased to $54.3 billion. Fourteen percent of total 
U.S. merchandise exports were destined for Mexico and 12% of U.S. merchandise imports came 
from Mexico.49 In services, the United States had a surplus of $12.3 billion in 2012 in trade with 
Mexico. U.S. private services exports to Mexico increased from $10.4 billion in 1993 to $27.4 
billion in 2012. U.S. private services imports from Mexico increased from $7.4 billion in 1993 to 
$15.1 billion in 2012, as shown in Table A-2.50 
NAFTA’s Effect on the U.S. Economy 
The overall net effect of NAFTA on the U.S. economy has been relatively small, primarily 
because total trade with both Mexico and Canada was equal to less than 5% of U.S. GDP at the 
time NAFTA went into effect. Because many, if not most, of the economic effects came as a result 
of U.S.-Mexico trade liberalization, it is also important to take into account that two-way trade 
with Mexico was equal to an even smaller percentage of GDP (1.4%) in 1994. Thus, any changes 
in trade patterns would not be expected to be significant in relation to the overall U.S. economy. A 
major challenge in assessing NAFTA is separating the effects that came as a result of the 
agreement from other factors. U.S. trade with Mexico and Canada was already growing prior to 
NAFTA and it likely would have continued to do so without an agreement. A 2003 report by the 
Congressional Budget Office observed that it was difficult to precisely measure the effects of 
NAFTA. It estimated that NAFTA likely increased annual U.S. GDP, but by a very small amount 
– “probably no more than a few billion dollars, or a few hundredths of a percent.”51 In some 
sectors, trade-related effects could have been more significant, especially in those industries that 
were more exposed to the removal of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, such as the textile, 
apparel, automotive, and agriculture industries. 
Studies by the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) on the effects of NAFTA pointed 
out the difficulty in isolating the agreement’s effects from other factors. Although the effects of 
NAFTA are not easily measured, the USITC provided some estimates over the years. A 2003 
study estimated that U.S. GDP could experience an increase between 0.1% and 0.5% upon full 
implementation of the agreement.52 Another USITC study that was congressionally mandated in 
1997 offered a comprehensive assessment of the operation and effects of NAFTA after three 
years.53 The report estimated that NAFTA had a small, but positive, effect on the overall U.S. 
                                                 
49 Merchandise trade statistics in this paragraph are derived from data from the U.S. International Trade Commission’s 
Interactive Tariff and Trade Data Web, at http://dataweb.usitc.gov. 
50 Services trade statistics in this paragraph are derived from the Bureau of Economic Analysis online database at 
http://www.bea.gov. 
51 Congressional Budget Office of the United States, “The Effects of NAFTA on U.S.-Mexican Trade and GDP,” A 
CBO Paper, May 2003, p. xiv.  
52 USITC, “The Impact of Trade Agreements: Effect of the Tokyo Round, U.S.-Israel FTA, U.S.-Canada FTA, 
NAFTA, and the Uruguay Round on the U.S. Economy,” Publication 3621, August 2003. 
53 USITC, “The Impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement on the U.S. Economy and Industries: A Three-
(continued...) 
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economy. Some of the findings include the following: data inadequacies at the industry level 
made it difficult to isolate the effects of NAFTA on absolute trade flows; U.S. trade with NAFTA 
partners increased more rapidly than U.S. trade with the rest of the world; the share of U.S. 
exports in the Mexican market increased by a higher percentage than the share of total imports 
from other countries; industries such as autos, chemicals, textiles, and electronics benefitted by 
achieving synergies across the North American market.54 
U.S. Industries and Supply Chains 
Many economists and other observers have credited NAFTA with helping U.S. manufacturing 
industries, especially the U.S. auto industry, become more globally competitive through the 
development of supply chains.55 Much of the increase in U.S.-Mexico trade, for example, can be 
attributed to specialization as manufacturing and assembly plants have reoriented to take 
advantage of economies of scale. As a result, supply chains have been increasingly crossing 
national boundaries as manufacturing work is performed wherever it is most efficient.56 A 
reduction in tariffs in a given sector not only affects prices in that sector but also in industries that 
purchase intermediate inputs from that sector. The importance of these direct and indirect effects 
is often overlooked, according to one study. The study suggests that these linkages offer 
important trade and welfare gains from free trade agreements and that ignoring these input-output 
linkages could underestimate potential trade gains.57 
Much of the trade between the United States and its NAFTA partners occurs in the context of 
production sharing as manufacturers in each country work together to create goods. The 
expansion of trade has resulted in the creation of vertical supply relationships, especially along 
the U.S.-Mexico border. The flow of intermediate inputs produced in the United States and 
exported to Mexico and the return flow of finished products greatly increased the importance of 
the U.S.-Mexico border region as a production site.58 U.S. manufacturing industries, including 
automotive, electronics, appliances, and machinery, all rely on the assistance of Mexican 
manufacturers. One report estimates that 40% of the content of U.S. imports from Mexico and 
25% of the content of U.S. imports from Canada are of U.S. origin. In comparison, U.S. imports 
from China are said to have only 4% U.S. content. Taken together, goods from Mexico and 
Canada represent about 75% of all the U.S. domestic content that returns to the United States as 
imports.59  
NAFTA was instrumental in the integration of the North American auto industry, which 
experienced some of the most significant changes in trade following the agreement. U.S. auto 
parts producers may use inputs and components produced by another NAFTA partner to assemble 
                                                                 
(...continued) 
Year Review,” Publication 3045, June 1997. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Hufbauer and Schott, NAFTA Revisited, pp. 20-21. 
56 Ibid., p. 21. 
57 Lorenzo Caliendo and Fernando Parro, Estimates of the Trade and Welfare Effects of NAFTA, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, November 2012, pp. 1-5. 
58 Gordon H. Hanson, North American Economic Integration and Industry Location, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, June 1998.  
59 Christopher E. Wilson, Working Together: Economic Ties Between the United States and Mexico, Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, November 2011, pp. 1-5. 
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parts, which are then shipped to another NAFTA country where they are assembled into a vehicle 
that is sold in any of the three NAFTA countries.60 NAFTA provisions consisted of a phased 
elimination of tariffs and the gradual removal of many non-tariff barriers to trade. It provided for 
uniform country of origin provisions, enhanced protection of intellectual property rights, adopted 
less restrictive government procurement practices, and eliminated performance requirements on 
investors from other NAFTA countries. NAFTA established the removal of Mexico’s restrictive 
trade and investment policies and the elimination of U.S. tariffs on autos and auto parts.  
After NAFTA’s entry into force, U.S. trade in vehicles and auto parts increased rapidly. Mexico 
became a more significant trading partner in the U.S. motor vehicle market as U.S. auto exports 
to Mexico increased 245% while imports increased 587% (see Table 1). Mexico’s share in U.S. 
total trade in motor vehicles increased from 5% to 18% between 1993 and 2013, while the share 
from Canada and other countries decreased. In auto parts, Mexico’s share increased from 21% to 
36% over the same period. In 2013, Mexico was the leading supplier of automotive goods for the 
United States, accounting for 28% ($76.3 billion) of total U.S. motor vehicle and auto parts 
imports. Canada ranked second with 21% ($58.0 billion) of the U.S. market share in 2013.61 
Table 1. U.S. Trade in Vehicles and Auto Parts: 1993 and 2013 
(billions of U.S. dollars) 
 
1993 2013 
% Change 
1993-2011 
Exports Imports Total Exports Imports Total Exports Imports 
Mexico         
Vehicles 0.2 3.7 3.9 4.8 40.1 44.9 2300% 984% 
Parts 7.3 7.4 14.7 21.1 36.2 57.3 189% 389% 
Total 7.5 11.1 18.6 25.9 76.3 102.2 245% 587% 
Canada         
Vehicles 8.2 26.7 34.9 26.2 44.5 70.7 220% 67% 
Parts 18.2 10.3 28.5 26.5 13.5 40.0 46% 31% 
Total 26.4 37.0 63.4 52.7 58.0 110.7 100% 57% 
World         
Vehicles 18.9 63.0 81.9 73.1 175.7 248.8 287% 179% 
Parts 33.4 38.3 71.7 60.6 100.4 161.0 81% 162% 
Total 52.3 101.3 153.6 133.7 276.1 409.8 156% 173% 
Source: Compiled by CRS using trade data from the USITC at http://dataweb.usitc.gov. For 2013, “vehicles” consists 
of items under the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) number 3361 and “parts” consists of 
items under NAIC number 3363. 
Note: The NAICS is the standard used by Federal statistical agencies in classifying business establishments for the 
purpose of collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical data related to the U.S. business economy. 
                                                 
60 Business Roundtable, NAFTA: A Decade of Growth, p. 8. 
61 Merchandise trade statistics in this paragraph are derived from data from the U.S. International Trade Commission’s 
Interactive Tariff and Trade Data Web, at http://dataweb.usitc.gov. 
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A number of studies have found that NAFTA has brought economic and social benefits to the 
Mexican economy as a whole, but that the benefits have not been evenly distributed throughout 
the country.62 The agreement also had a positive impact on Mexican productivity. A 2011 World 
Bank study found that the increase in trade integration after NAFTA had a positive effect on 
stimulating the productivity of Mexican plants.63 Most post-NAFTA studies on economic effects 
have found that the net overall effects on the Mexican economy tended to be positive but modest. 
While there have been periods of positive and negative economic growth in Mexico after the 
agreement was implemented, it is difficult to measure precisely how much of these economic 
changes were attributed to NAFTA. A World Bank study assessing some of the economic impacts 
from NAFTA on Mexico concluded that NAFTA helped Mexico get closer to the levels of 
development in the United States and Canada. The study states that NAFTA helped Mexican 
manufacturers adapt to U.S. technological innovations more quickly; likely had positive impacts 
on the number and quality of jobs; reduced macroeconomic volatility, or wide variations in the 
GDP growth rate, in Mexico; increased the levels of synchronicity in business cycles in Mexico, 
the United States, and Canada; and reinforced the high sensitivity of Mexican economic sectors to 
economic developments in the United States.64 
Other studies suggest that NAFTA has been disappointing in that it failed to significantly improve 
the Mexican economy or lower income disparities between Mexico and its northern neighbors.65 
Some argue that the success of NAFTA in Mexico was probably limited by the fact that NAFTA 
was not supplemented by complementary policies that could have promoted a deeper regional 
integration effort. These policies could have included improvements in education, industrial 
policies, and/or investment in infrastructure.66 
One of the more controversial aspects of NAFTA is related to the agricultural sector in Mexico 
and the perception that NAFTA has caused a higher amount of worker displacement in this sector 
than in other economic sectors. Many critics of NAFTA say that the agreement led to severe job 
displacement in agriculture, especially in the corn sector. One study estimates these losses to have 
been over a million lost jobs in corn production between 1991 and 2000.67 However, while some 
of the changes in the agricultural sector are a direct result of NAFTA as Mexico began to import 
more lower-priced products from the United States, many of the changes can be attributed to 
Mexico’s unilateral agricultural reform measures in the 1980s and early 1990s. Most domestic 
reform measures consisted of privatization efforts and resulted in increased competition. 
Measures included eliminating state enterprises related to agriculture and removing staple price 
                                                 
62 See for example, Robert A. Blecker and Gerardo Esquivel, NAFTA, Trade, and Development, Center for U.S.-
Mexican Studies (San Diego), El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and 
El Colegio de Mexico, WP 10-03, 2010; and Daniel Lederman, William F. Maloney, and Luis Servén, Lessons from 
NAFTA for Latin America and the Caribbean, The World Bank, 2005. 
63 Rafael E. de Hoyos and Leonardo Iacovone, Economic Performance under NAFTA, The World Bank Development 
Research Group, May 2011, pp. 25-27. 
64 Daniel Lederman, William F. Maloney, and Luis Servén, Lessons from NAFTA for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, The World Bank, 2005.  
65 Robert A. Blecker and Gerardo Esquivel, NAFTA, Trade, and Development, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, the 
Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center, El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, and El Colegio de México, USMEX 
WP 10-03, 2010.  
66 Ibid., p. 22.  
67 Robert E. Scott, Carlos Salas, Bruce Campbell and Jeff Faux, Revisiting NAFTA: Still Not Working for North 
America’s Workers, Economic Policy Institute, Briefing Paper #173, p. 43.  
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supports and subsidies.68 These reforms coincided with NAFTA negotiations and continued 
beyond the implementation of NAFTA in 1994. The unilateral reforms in the agricultural sector 
make it difficult to separate those effects from the effects of NAFTA. 
U.S.-Mexico Trade Market Shares 
Mexico relies heavily on the United States as an export market; this reliance has diminished very 
slightly over the years. The percentage of Mexico’s total exports going to the United States 
decreased from 83% in 1993 to 78% in 2012 (see Figure 4). In addition, its share of the U.S. 
market has lost ground since 2003 when China surpassed Mexico as the second-leading supplier 
of U.S. imports. The United States is losing market share of Mexico’s import market. Between 
1993 and 2012, the U.S. share of Mexico’s imports decreased from 78% to 55%. China is 
Mexico’s second-leading source of imports. 
Figure 4. Market Share as Percentage of Total Trade: Mexico and the United States 
(1993-2012) 
 
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, from IMF International Financial Statistics. 
Notes: Represents exports to and imports from other country as percentage of country’s total trade. Statistics 
prior to 1993 are not available. 
U.S. and Mexican Foreign Direct Investment 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been an integral part of the economic relationship between 
the United States and Mexico for many years, especially after NAFTA. Two-way investment 
                                                 
68 Mexico’s unilateral agricultural reform measures removed government subsidies and price controls in the agricultural 
sector that resulted in rising prices for tortillas. Tortillas are the basic staple for the Mexican diet and a necessity of the 
poor. For this reason, higher prices had a greater effect on the poor than on middle- and higher-income Mexicans. 
Mexico also reformed its Agrarian Law. Lands that had been distributed to ejidos or community rural groups following 
the 1910 revolution gained the right to privatize. This led to more efficient production processes, especially in Northern 
states. 
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increased rapidly after the agreement went into effect. The United States is the largest source of 
FDI in Mexico. The stock of U.S. FDI in Mexico increased from $15.2 billion in 1993 to $101.0 
billion in 2012, a 564% increase (see Table A-4 in Appendix A). The flows of FDI have been 
affected by other factors over the years, with higher growth during the period of economic 
expansion during the late 1990s, and slower growth in recent years, possibly due to the economic 
downturn caused by the 2008 global financial crisis and/or the increased violence in Mexico. 
Mexican FDI in the United States, while substantially lower than U.S. investment in Mexico, has 
also increased rapidly, from $1.2 billion in 1993 to $14.9 billion in 2012, an increase of over 
1000% (See Table A-4).69 
While Mexico’s unilateral trade and investment liberalization measures in the 1980s and early 
1990s contributed to the increase of U.S. FDI in Mexico, NAFTA provisions on foreign 
investment may have helped to lock in Mexico’s reforms and increase investor confidence. 
NAFTA helped give U.S. and Canadian investors nondiscriminatory treatment of their 
investments as well as investor protection in Mexico. Nearly half of total FDI investment in 
Mexico is in the manufacturing industry. 
Income Disparity 
One of the main arguments in favor of NAFTA at the time it was being proposed by policy 
makers was that the agreement would improve economic conditions in Mexico and narrow the 
income disparity between Mexico and the United States and Canada. Studies that have addressed 
the issue of economic convergence70 have noted that economic convergence in North America has 
failed to materialize. One study states that NAFTA failed to fulfill the promise of closing the 
Mexico-U.S. development gap and that this was partially due to the lack of deeper forms of 
regional integration or cooperation between Mexico and the United States.71 The study contends 
that domestic policies in both countries, along with underlying geographic and demographic 
realities, contribute to the continuing disparities in income. The authors argue that neither Mexico 
nor the United States adopted complementary policies after NAFTA that could have promoted a 
more successful regional integration effort. These policies could include education, industrial 
policies, and more investment in border and transportation infrastructure. The authors also note 
that other developments, such as increased security along the U.S.-Mexico border after the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, have made it much more difficult for the movement of goods and 
services across the border and for improving regional integration. They argue that the two 
countries could cooperate on policies that foster convergence and economic development in 
Mexico instead of increasing security and “building walls.”72  
A World Bank study states that NAFTA brought economic and social benefits to the Mexican 
economy, but that it is not enough to help narrow the disparities in economic conditions between 
                                                 
69 Foreign direct investment data in this section is derived from data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis online 
database at http://www.bea.gov. 
70 Economic convergence can be broadly defined as a narrowing of the disparities in the economic levels and the 
manufacturing performances of particular countries or their regions. The goal of the theory of economic convergence is 
to research and analyze the factors influencing the rates of economic growth and real per capita income in countries. 
71 Robert A. Blecker and Gerardo Esquivel, NAFTA, Trade, and Development, Working Paper 10-03, Center for U.S.-
Mexican Studies (San Diego), the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson Center (Washington DC), El Colegio de la 
Frontera Norte (Tijuana), and El Colegio de México (Mexico City), 2010, p. 2. 
72 Ibid., pp. 19-23. 
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Mexico and the United States.73 It contends that Mexico needs to invest more in education, 
innovation and infrastructure, and in the quality of national institutions. The study also states that 
income convergence between a Latin American country and the United States is limited by the 
wide differences in the quality of domestic institutions, in the innovation dynamics of domestic 
firms, and in the skills of the labor force. While NAFTA had a positive effect on wages and 
employment in some Mexican states, the wage differential within the country increased as a result 
of trade liberalization.74 Another study also notes that the ability of Mexico to improve economic 
conditions depends on its capacity to improve its national institutions, adding that Mexican 
institutions did not improve significantly more than those of other Latin American countries since 
NAFTA went into effect.75 
Effect on Canada 
As noted earlier, the U.S.-Canada FTA came into effect on January 1, 1989. Thus, trade 
liberalization between the two countries was well underway—or already completed—by the time 
of the implementation of NAFTA. This section summarizes the effect of trade liberalization from 
both agreements on Canada. 
From the Canadian perspective, the important consequence of the FTA may have been what did 
not happen, that is, that many of the fears of opening up trade with the United States did not come 
to pass. Canada did not become an economic appendage or “51st state” as many had feared. It did 
not lose control over its water or energy resources; its manufacturing sector was not gutted. 
Rather, as one Canadian commentator remarked, “free trade helped Canada to grow up, to turn its 
face out to the world, to embrace its future as a trading nation, [and] to get over its chronic sense 
of inferiority.”76 However, some hopes for the FTA, for example, that it would be a catalyst for 
greater productivity in Canadian industry, also have not come to pass. 
U.S.-Canada Trade Market Shares 
The United States is the number one purchaser of Canadian goods and supplier of imports to 
Canada. Canada’s share of its exports going to the United States steadily increased during the 
1980s, from 60.6% in 1980 to 70.7% in 1989, the first year of the FTA. Canada’s percentage of 
total exports to the United States continued to increase, reaching 87.7% in 2002. The relative 
importance of the value of U.S. and Canadian trade with each other, however, has been falling in 
recent years. Since 2002, this percentage has steadily fallen back to 74.5% in 2012. The U.S. 
share of Canada’s total imports, which reached a peak of 70.0% in 1983, topped out at 68.7% 
during the free trade era and has been steadily dropping ever since to a low of 50.6% in 2012 (see 
Figure 5). 
                                                 
73 Lederman, Maloney, and Servén, Lessons from NAFTA for Latin America and the Caribbean, The World Bank, 
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74 Ibid. 
75 William Easterly, Norbert Fiess, and Daniel Lederman, “NAFTA and Convergence in North America: High 
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Traditionally, Canada was the largest purchaser of U.S. exports and supplier of U.S. imports; 
however, shares of both peaked before the free trade era. Canada purchased 23.5% of U.S. 
exports in 1987 and equaled that figure in 2005, but it has since fallen off to 18.9% in 2012. 
Canada traditionally was the largest supplier of U.S. imports, peaking at 20.6% in 1984, reaching 
a NAFTA high of 20.1% in 1996, but has declined thereafter to 14.4% in 2012. China displaced 
Canada as the largest supplier of U.S. imports in 2007. 
Figure 5. Market Share as Percentage of Total Trade: Canada and the United States 
(1980-2012) 
 
Source: Economic Intelligence Unit, from IMF International Financial Statistics. 
Note: Represents exports to and imports from other country as percentage of country’s total trade. 
The composition of trade has also changed. Canada initially entered a manufacturing recession 
after the conclusion of the FTA as branch plants of U.S. companies set up behind the Canadian 
tariff wall were abandoned. However, more internationally competitive manufacturing sectors 
thrived as long as the Canadian dollar (nicknamed the loonie for the soaring loon pictured on its 
reverse) was relatively cheap. From a low point of a Canadian dollar worth US$0.65 in 2002, the 
loonie reached parity in 2007, and has hovered around the parity point until 2013 before sliding to 
a recent US$0.92. The appreciation has been attributed to the boom in Canada’s natural 
resources—oil and gas displaced motor vehicles as Canada’s largest export to the United States in 
2005. The “great recession” and the woes of the integrated North American auto sector also took 
a toll on Canadian manufacturing. 
For some advocates in Canada, free trade was meant to alleviate the long-term labor productivity 
gap between the United States and Canada. Open competition was seen as forcing Canadian 
industry to be more productive. In much of the free trade era, this gap could be accounted for by 
the low value of the Canadian dollar. As adding capital equipment (often purchased from the 
United States) was relatively more expensive than hiring extra workers, the latter was often 
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employed. The appreciation of the Canadian dollar has made additional capitalization more 
attractive, but labor productivity recently remained only at 72% of U.S. levels.77 The relatively 
low productivity levels of Canadian industry, as well as its relatively low investments in research 
and development (R&D), and relatively lower expenditures on information technology, are seen 
as threatening to Canadian long-term competitiveness, and remain of concern to Canadian policy 
makers, despite leading the organization of Economic Cooperation and Development’s ranking of 
the population with post-secondary education.78 
U.S. and Canadian Foreign Direct Investment 
Two-way investment has also increased markedly during the free trade era, both in terms of stock 
and flow of investment. The United States is the largest single investor in Canada with a stock of 
FDI into Canada reaching $351.5 billion in 2012, up from a stock of $69.9 billion in 1993 (see 
Table A-4). U.S. investment represents nearly 51.5% of the total stock of FDI in Canada from 
global investors. U.S. FDI flows into Canada averaged $3.28 billion in the five years prior to the 
FTA, and actually fell to an average of $1.7 billion in the first six years of the FTA, mainly 
attributed to divestments of U.S.-owned branch plants in Canada. However, U.S. flows into 
Canada increased markedly to an average of $14.9 billion during the years 1995 to 2012.79 The 
stock of U.S. FDI is now equivalent to 18% of the value of Canadian GDP, in contrast to 1% at 
the beginning of the FTA. 
While Canada is not the largest investor in the United States, the United States was the largest 
destination for Canadian FDI in 2012 with a stock of $225.3 billion, an increase from $26.6 
billion in 1988.80 Approximately 40.7% of Canadian FDI was invested in the United States in 
2012. Canadian FDI flows into the United States annually averaged $2.3 billion in five years 
prior to the FTA, and an annual average of $1.8 billion during the FTA years, but increased to an 
annual average of $9.9 billion from 1995 to 2012.81 These trends highlight the changing view of 
FDI among Canadians, from one that could be considered fearful or hostile to FDI as vehicles of 
foreign control over the Canadian economy, to one that is more welcoming of new jobs and 
techniques that result from FDI. 
Issues for Congress 
Many economists and business representatives generally look at NAFTA as a success and credit it 
for fueling unprecedented North American trade and creating job growth in the United States. 
They look to build on NAFTA’s momentum to improve trade relations and economic integration 
within the region. However, labor groups and some consumer-advocacy groups argue that the 
agreement has had negative effects. They maintain that the agreement resulted in outsourcing and 
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lower wages that have had a negative effect on the U.S. economy and that it has caused job 
dislocations in Mexico, especially in agriculture.82 
Given the increasing number of regional trade agreements throughout the world and the ongoing 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade negotiations, one general question that policy makers 
may consider in forming future trade policy is whether or not NAFTA has lost its relevance. The 
numerous FTAs that the United States, Mexico, and Canada have put into effect have given other 
countries the same preferences to the U.S. market that Canada and Mexico benefit from under 
NAFTA. Similarly, these FTAs have lessened the preferences the United States has in other 
markets. 
Both proponents and critics of NAFTA agree that the three countries should look at what the 
agreement has failed to do as they look to the future of North American trade and economic 
relations. Policies could include strengthening institutions to protect the environment and worker 
rights; considering the establishment of a border infrastructure plan; increasing regulatory 
cooperation; promoting research and development to enhance the global competiveness of North 
American industries; investing in more border infrastructure to make border crossings more 
efficient; and/or creating more efforts to lessen income differentials within the region. 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
In December 2012, Canada and Mexico began participating in the ongoing negotiations for a 
proposed TPP free trade agreement (FTA) among 12 countries in the Asia-Pacific region.83 The 
United States is an active participant in the negotiations and was among the first tranche of 
countries to join the original four members of the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership 
(Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore) to launch the TPP negotiations in the fall of 2008. 
With 26 negotiating groups and 29 chapters under discussion, the TPP partners envision the 
agreement to be “comprehensive and high-standard,” in that they seek to eliminate tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers to trade in goods, services, and agriculture, and to establish rules on a wide 
range of issues, including intellectual property rights, foreign direct investment and other 
economic activities. They also strive to create a “21st century agreement” that addresses new and 
cross-cutting issues presented by an increasingly globalized economy. 
The United States has indicated that it is only negotiating bilateral market access in the TPP talks 
with countries with which it does not have FTAs—Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, and 
Vietnam. The addition of Japan to the negotiations in the summer of 2013 may afford all three 
NAFTA countries with the possibility of additional market opening opportunities. However, the 
United States has sought to go beyond current U.S. FTAs in its proposed rules chapters. This has 
become a point of contention in the talks and may become an issue for Canada and Mexico as 
well. The TPP may have implications for NAFTA in several areas, including intellectual property 
rights (IPR), investment, services, government procurement, as well as labor and environmental 
provisions. The related provisions in more recent free trade agreements that the United States has 
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negotiated, such as those with Colombia, Panama, Peru, and South Korea, include commitments 
that go beyond NAFTA. If agreement is reached on a TPP, Canada and Mexico may have to 
adhere to stronger and more enforceable labor and environmental provisions, stronger IPR 
provisions, as well as some issues that were not addressed in detail in the NAFTA, such as 
disciplines on state-owned enterprises. 
Regulatory Cooperation 
Policy makers may consider issues on how the United States can improve cooperation with its 
North American neighbors in the areas of trade, transportation, competitiveness, economic 
growth, and security enhancement. The United States, Canada, and Mexico have made efforts 
since 2005 to increase cooperation on these issues through various endeavors, most notably by 
participating in trilateral summits known as the North American Leaders Summits. The most 
recent Summit took place on February 19, 2014, in Toluca, Mexico. President Barack Obama met 
with Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper to 
discuss the economic well-being of the region; education initiatives; energy and climate change; 
citizen security; and regional, global, and stakeholder outreach.84  
After the first North American Leaders’ Summit on March 23, 2005 in Waco, TX, the three 
countries agreed on enhancing regulatory cooperation through the former initiative known as the 
Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP). The main goal was to increase and 
enhance prosperity in the United States, Canada, and Mexico through regulatory cooperation.85 
The Obama Administration has affirmed its commitment to continue past efforts on North 
American cooperation but under a different approach from the SPP initiative. While these efforts 
have served as mechanisms to increase communications on issues of mutual interest, their role 
has been limited because there are no binding agreements.  
The former SPP initiative evolved to other efforts pursued by the Obama Administration for 
regulatory cooperation, which have included separate bilateral endeavors. For example, in May 
2010, the United States and Mexico released the Declaration Concerning Twenty-first Century 
Border Management and, in December 2011, the United States and Canada announced the 
Beyond the Border Action Plan: A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic 
Competiveness. In February 2012, the United States and Mexico announced the High-Level 
Regulatory Cooperation Council (HLRCC) to help align regulatory principles, an effort similar to 
the U.S.-Canada Regulatory Cooperation Council. In March 2012, the Defense Ministers of the 
three countries met in Ottawa, Canada, for the first ever “Trilateral Meetings of North American 
Defense Ministers” to increase cooperation on national security issues. 
Some critics of North American trilateral cooperation contend that the efforts are an attempt to 
create a common market or economic union in North America. Others contend that past efforts 
under the SPP were contributing to the creation of a so-called “NAFTA Superhighway” that 
would link the United States, Canada, and Mexico with a “super-corridor.”86 Proponents of North 
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American competitiveness and security cooperation view the initiatives as constructive to 
addressing issues of mutual interest and benefit for all three countries. Business groups generally 
support increased North American cooperation and believe that it is necessary to enhance the 
competitiveness of U.S. businesses in the global market. 
Proposals for Deeper Regional Integration 
The rising number of regional trade agreements throughout the world, in addition to the rising 
presence of China in Latin America, could have implications for U.S. trade policy with its 
NAFTA partners beyond the proposed TPP. Some trade policy experts contend that a deepening 
of economic relations with Canada and Mexico will help promote a common trade agenda with 
shared values. In addition to economic effects, forming deeper trade and investment ties would 
have positive implications for corporate governance, labor rights, environmental protection, and 
democratic governance.87 
Some policy experts emphasize the importance of North American trade in intermediate goods 
and supply chains. They argue that the governments of the three countries should improve 
cooperation in this area and invest more in improving border infrastructure. The increased 
security measures that began after September 11, 2001 have resulted in a disruption in production 
chains due to extended and unpredictable wait times along the border. This has disproportionately 
hurt small and medium sized businesses.88 The United States and Mexico have recognized the 
need to enhance cooperation on prioritizing the economic relationship and security and have 
developed the Twenty-First Century Border Initiative for this purpose.89 While the initiative has 
resulted in improvements along the border, some observers contend that policy makers could 
devote more energy to improving cooperation and enhancing efficiency in cross-border trade.  
Other experts have proposed ideas to address ongoing problems in the region and make North 
American industries more competitive. Some proposals that have emerged include calls for 
rethinking the current trade relationship under NAFTA by broadening the scope of North 
American integration and cooperation. One idea, for example, is to develop a North American 
Investment Fund to help close the income gap between Mexico and its northern neighbors. The 
proposed fund would be administered by the World Bank and used to fund infrastructure projects 
to connect the south of Mexico to the United States and Canada, and also to improve post-
secondary education in Mexico.90 Other ideas are to set up a Customs Union in North America, 
such as that of the European Union, with a common external tariff to facilitate trade and deepen 
North American integration; develop a cooperative approach on immigration; and promote 
regulatory convergence.91 The proponents of these ideas admit that it would be very difficult for 
Congress to approve these proposals in the near future, but argue that it is important to think 
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about such options based on the increasing interdependence among NAFTA partners and common 
interests concerning the future of the region. 
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Appendix A. U.S. Merchandise Trade with 
NAFTA Partners 
Table A-1. U.S. Merchandise Trade with NAFTA Partners 
(billions of nominal U.S. dollars) 
 Canada Mexico Total NAFTA  
Year Exports Imports 
Trade 
Balance Exports Imports 
Trade 
Balance Exports Imports 
Trade 
Balance 
1993 100.2 110.9 -10.7 41.6 39.9 1.7 141.8 150.8 -9.0 
1994 114.3 128.9 -14.6 50.8 49.5 1.3 165.1 178.4 -13.3 
1995 126.0 145.1 -19.1 46.3 61.7 -15.4 172.3 206.8 -34.5 
1996 132.6 156.5 -23.9 56.8 73.0 -16.2 189.4 229.5 -40.1 
1997 150.1 168.1 -18 71.4 85.9 -14.5 221.5 254.0 -32.5 
1998 154.2 174.8 -20.6 79.0 94.7 -15.7 233.2 269.5 -36.3 
1999 163.9 198.3 -34.4 87.0 109.7 -22.7 250.9 308.0 -57.1 
2000 176.4 229.2 -52.8 111.7 135.9 -24.2 288.1 365.1 -77.0 
2001 163.7 217.0 -53.3 101.5 131.4 -29.9 265.2 348.4 -83.2 
2002 160.8 210.6 -49.8 97.5 134.7 -37.2 258.3 345.3 -87.0 
2003 169.5 224.2 -54.7 97.5 138.1 -40.6 267.0 362.3 -95.3 
2004 187.7 255.9 -68.2 110.8 155.8 -45 298.5 411.7 -113.2 
2005 211.4 287.9 -76.5 120.0 170.2 -50.2 331.4 458.1 -126.7 
2006 230.3 303.4 -73.1 134.2 198.3 -64.1 364.5 501.7 -137.2 
2007 248.4 313.1 -64.7 136.5 210.8 -74.3 384.9 523.9 -139.0 
2008 260.9 335.6 -74.7 151.5 215.9 -64.4 412.4 551.5 -139.1 
2009 204.7 224.9 -20.2 129.0 176.5 -47.5 333.7 401.4 -67.7 
2010 248.2 276.5 -28.3 164.3 229.7 -65.4 412.5 506.2 -93.7 
2011 280.8 316.5 -35.7 197.5 263.1 -65.6 478.3 579.6 -101.3 
2012 291.8 324.2 -32.4 216.3 277.7 -61.4 508.1 601.9 -93.8 
2013 300.2 332.1 -31.9 226.2 280.5 -54.3 526.4 612.5 -86.1 
Source: Compiled by CRS using trade data from the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Interactive Tariff 
and Trade Data Web, at http://dataweb.usitc.gov. 
 
NAFTA at 20: Overview and Trade Effects 
 
Congressional Research Service 28 
Table A-2. U.S. Private Services Trade with NAFTA Partners 
(billions of nominal U.S. dollars) 
 Canada Mexico Total NAFTA  
Year Exports Imports 
Services 
Trade 
Balance Exports Imports 
Services 
Trade 
Balance Exports Imports 
Services 
Trade 
Balance 
1993 17.0 9.1 7.9 10.4 7.4 3.0 27.4 16.5 10.9 
1994 17.2 9.9 7.3 11.3 7.9 3.4 28.5 17.8 10.7 
1995 17.9 11.0 6.9 8.7 7.9 0.8 26.6 18.9 7.7 
1996 19.5 12.4 7.1 9.4 8.9 0.5 28.9 21.3 7.6 
1997 20.5 13.7 6.8 10.8 9.9 0.9 31.3 23.6 7.7 
1998 19.4 15.0 4.4 11.7 9.8 1.9 31.1 24.8 6.3 
1999 22.7 16.2 6.5 14.1 9.4 4.7 36.8 25.6 11.2 
2000 24.6 17.9 6.7 15.5 10.8 4.7 40.1 28.7 11.4 
2001 24.4 17.4 7.0 16.4 10.4 6.0 40.8 27.8 13.0 
2002 25.0 18.0 7.0 17.4 11.6 5.8 42.4 29.6 12.8 
2003 27.3 19.6 7.7 18.2 12.1 6.1 45.5 31.7 13.8 
2004 29.5 20.7 8.8 19.2 13.6 5.6 48.7 34.3 14.4 
2005 32.6 22.0 10.6 22.4 14.2 8.2 55.0 36.2 18.8 
2006 37.6 23.2 14.4 23.7 14.6 9.1 61.3 37.8 23.5 
2007 42.5 25.0 17.5 24.9 15.2 9.7 67.4 40.2 27.2 
2008 44.9 25.1 19.8 25.9 15.5 10.4 70.8 40.6 30.2 
2009 43.1 22.9 20.2 22.6 13.6 9.0 65.7 36.5 29.2 
2010 52.5 26.5 26.0 24.4 13.6 10.8 76.9 40.1 36.8 
2011 58.4 28.4 30.0 25.6 13.9 11.7 84.0 42.3 41.7 
2012 61.2 29.8 31.4 27.4 15.1 12.3 88.6 44.9 43.7 
Source: Compiled by CRS using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis online database at 
http://www.bea.gov. 
 
NAFTA at 20: Overview and Trade Effects 
 
Congressional Research Service 29 
Table A-3. U.S. Trade with NAFTA Partners by Major Product Category: 2013 
(billions of nominal U.S. dollars) 
 U.S. Exports U.S. Imports 
NAFTA 
Partner 
Leading Items  
(NAIC 4-digit level) Value 
Leading Items  
(NAIC 4-digit level) Value 
Canada Motor vehicle parts 26.5 Oil and gas 87.6 
 Motor vehicles 26.2 Motor vehicles 44.5 
 Petroleum and coal products 14.9 Petroleum and coal products 18.7 
 Agriculture and construction 
machinery 
11.9 Motor vehicle parts 13.5 
 Other general purpose machinery 9.5 Nonferrous metal and processing 10.8 
 All Other 211.2 All Other 157.0 
 Total exports to Canada 300.2 Total imports from Canada 332.1 
Mexico Motor vehicle parts 21.1 Motor vehicles 40.1 
 Petroleum and coal products 19.3 Motor vehicle parts 36.2 
 Computer equipment 14.8 Oil and gas 32.0 
 Semiconductors and other 
electronic components 
13.0 Computer equipment 14.8 
 Basic chemicals 10.1 Audio and video equipment 13.8 
 All other 147.9 All other 143.6 
 Total Exports to Mexico 226.2 Total Imports from Mexico 280.5 
Source: Compiled by CRS using trade data from the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Interactive Tariff 
and Trade Data Web, at http://dataweb.usitc.gov.  
Notes: The North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) is the standard used by federal statistical 
agencies in classifying business establishments for the purpose of collecting, analyzing, and publishing statistical 
data related to the U.S. business economy. 
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Table A-4. U.S. Foreign Direct Investment Positions with Canada and Mexico 
(1993-2012 historical cost basis [millions of U.S. dollars]) 
Year 
Canadian FDI 
in the U.S. 
U.S. FDI in 
Canada 
Mexican FDI 
in the U.S. 
U.S. FDI in 
Mexico 
1993 40,373 69,922 1,244 15,221 
1994 41,219 74,221 2,069 16,968 
1995 45,618 83,498 1,850 16,873 
1996 54,836 89,592 1,641 19,351 
1997 65,175 96,626 3,100 24,050 
1998 72,696 98,200 2,055 26,657 
1999 90,559 119,590 1,999 37,151 
2000 114,309 132,472 7,462 39,352 
2001 92,420 152,601 6,645 52,544 
2002 92,529 166,473 7,829 56,303 
2003 95,707 187,953 9,022 56,851 
2004 125,276 214,931 7,592 63,384 
2005 165,667 231,836 3,595 73,687 
2006 165,281 205,134 5,310 82,965 
2007 201,924 250,642 8,478 91,046 
2008 168,746 246,483 8,420 87,443 
2009 188,943 265,326 11,111 82,286 
2010 188,943 289,535 11,267 84,288 
2011 210,864 318,964 13,763 91,402 
2012 225,331 351,460 14,883 101,030 
Source: Compiled by CRS using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis online database at 
http://www.bea.gov. 
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Appendix B. Mexico’s Protectionist Trade Policies 
Prior to NAFTA 
Summary of Mexico’s Protectionist Policies Prior to NAFTA 
For decades prior to NAFTA Mexico relied on import substitution policies, restrictions on foreign investment, and a 
controlled exchange rate to help foster domestic growth and to protect itself from a perceived risk of foreign 
domination. 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Mexico had a strong state presence prior to NAFTA. During the late 1950s 
and 1960s, the number of state-owned enterprises in Mexico almost doubled from 144 to 272. By 1982, the number 
of SOES had increased to 1,155. Mexico’s economic reforms and divestiture of the state owned sector that occurred 
during the period of 1983 to 1993 decreased the number of SOEs to 258. By the end of 2003, the number of SOEs 
dropped to 210. 
Import Licenses. Mexico had import license requirements on most, if not all, Mexican imports. The government 
began to phase these out in the mid-1980s. By the time NAFTA negotiations started, import licenses were required 
on only 230 products of the nearly 12,000 items in the Mexican tariff schedule. In agricultural goods, 60% of U.S. 
exports to Mexico required import licenses or faced other nontariff barriers. There was also a lack of transparency of 
procedures through which exporters to Mexico could apply for the proper license, certificate, or test. 
Foreign Investment Restrictions. Mexico’s restrictive Law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate Foreign 
Investment was in effect at the time of NAFTA negotiations, though Mexico had started liberalizing some restrictions 
in the mid-1980s. In 1991, 37% of Mexican economic activity was not open to 100% foreign investment ownership. 
Auto Industry Import Substitution Policy (Auto Decrees). Mexico had a restrictive import substitution policy 
that began in the 1960s through a series of Mexican Auto Decrees in which the government sought to supply the 
entire Mexican market through domestically-produced automotive goods. The decrees established import tariffs as 
high as 25% on automotive goods and had high restrictions on foreign auto production in Mexico. The decrees 
prohibited imports of finished vehicles; imposed high domestic-content requirements on foreign manufacturers 
producing cars in Mexico; issued export requirements in which a certain amount of exports was required for every 
dollar of imports. The government issued the final decree in 1989, after joining the GATT, liberalizing rules on the 
industry but not entirely eliminating them. Auto manufacturers were still required to have a certain percentage of 
domestic content in their products and meet export requirements, both of which were considered huge impediments 
to the industry. Even after joining the GATT, Mexico had tariffs of 20% or more on imports of automobiles and auto 
parts.  
Restrictions in Agriculture. In the period after the 1910 revolution and until the 1980s, Mexico had a land 
distribution system in which land was redistributed from wealthy land owners and managed by the government. This 
ejido system, formed under Mexico’s Agrarian Law, changed in the 1980s when the government began to implement 
agricultural and trade policy reform measures. Changes included the privatization of the ejido system in order to 
stimulate competition. Mexico’s unilateral reform measures included eliminating state enterprises related to 
agriculture and removing staple price supports and subsidies. Mexico also had a government agency known as 
CONASUPO which intervened in the agriculture sector. The agency bought staples from farmers at guaranteed 
prices and processed the products or sold them at low prices to processors and consumers. Many of Mexico’s 
domestic reforms in agriculture coincided with NAFTA negotiations, beginning in 1991, and continued beyond the 
implementation of NAFTA in 1994. The unilateral reforms in the agricultural sector make it difficult to separate those 
effects from the effects of NAFTA. By 1999, CONASUPO had been abolished.  
Sources: United States International Trade Commission (USITC), The Likely Impact on the United States of a Free 
Trade Agreement with Mexico, Publication 2353, February 1991.Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, Institute for 
International Economics, NAFTA Revisited, October 2005. Alberto Chong and Florencio López-de-Silanes, Privatization 
in Mexico, Inter-American Development Bank, Working Paper #513, August 2004. 
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